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POINT I 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF FRAUD 
Assuming for r.he sak^ <->f argument that a party opposing 
discovery before the filing or the mot io:- :i;ust estaoiish the 
defense of fraud "•r- -h^ inducement f .- * »ar and <~or"incinq 
met in t ~ L- rase. 
There ^rs^r *• psfimorr* ^ - ^ +-V Promisscrv Note was 
exe •. _..C...L ~r, ~.u> ;he 
subject premises were vacc•: with prospects :o: a 
replacement tenant (Floor Affidavit, , d. 191-192; I • A . 
19 2) , 
The u icontroverted ^iu: documented evidence further 
demons"' — - • • nr - -r,4-** >• i 
Park, the subject premises had ween ,eased :.• .* repxcu-ement 
tenant p: : •-. .--cution of ::>> Promissory Note 
( A f f i r • • " 
The existence of the liauduient iepLesentalxuu and Gump 
& Ayers1 reliance thereon is graphically demonstrated by the 
JIM I / i yu i 1.. n ' execute a piomistfoi > nnlfe 
in a principal sum which was $22,386 in excess of its existing 
liability (R. 194-195). 
It should further be noted, that the Affidavit of Jerry 
Floor identified Thomas Lloyd as the individual who made the 
fraudulent statement (Floor Affidavit, J 8, R. 192). In this 
regard, Thomas Lloyd filed three separate affidavits in this 
case (R. 53, 285, 502). Two of the three affidavits were 
filed after the filing of the Affidavit of Jerry Floor. At no 
time in any of the three affidavits did Thomas Lloyd deny 
making the fraudulent statements. It is respectfully 
submitted that uncontroverted evidence is "clear and 
convincing." 
The uncontroverted statement that the subject premises 
were vacant with no prospect for a replacement tenant coupled 
with a written lease agreement which clearly demonstrated that 
such statement was false together with Gump & Ayers' execution 
of a promissory note which was $22,386 in excess of its 
existing liability, considered together, would permit a jury 
to find the existence of fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
2 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL SUPPORT 
FOR UNION PARK'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
FRAUD WAS IMMATERIAL 
In its brief, Union Park argues that its fraud is 
immaterial inasmuch as the fruits of the fraud produced only 
$22,386.1s1 in excess of accrued rents. 
In an apparent attempt to persuade the Court to accept 
the proposition that fraud is permissible when it succeeds in 
inducing the payment of "small amounts," Union Park argues 
that its fraud should be excused by reason of the fact that 
damages would have been $487,775.76 if the Promissory Note had 
not been signed. On this basis, Union Park claims that its 
fraudulent statements were "immaterial." 
Assuming Union Park's argument is worthy of serious 
consideration, it should be noted that the calculation of 
"damages" of $487,775.76 is based upon a series of unsupported 
factual and legal conclusions. All components of the claimed 
"damage" have no factual and/or legal support and demand the 
scrutiny of discovery and cross examination. 
The focus of Union Park's argument on the materiality of 
the fraud consists of a series of unsupported factual and 
legal conclusions purporting to claim "damages" that were 
Union Park claims that the amount in excess of accrued liability was $13,133,04. 
3 
caused by a series of events that were not directly caused by 
Gump & Ayers1 termination of the Lease. Some of the events 
clearly resulted in economic benefits to Union Park. However, 
Union Park has ignored the economic benefits in an attempt to 
create the appearance of substantial damages. 
Union Park asserts that it relet less than all of the 
premises previously occupied by Gump & Ayers (R. 35, 60); 
Union Park claims that Matrix vacated other space in order to 
occupy the subject premises (R. 35, 60); Union Park claims 
that it was "forced" to relet the subject premises at a 
reduced rental rate (R. 35, 60); and, Union Park asserts that 
it was "forced" to expend $18,559 for capital improvements to 
the subject premises (R. 36, 60). Each of these claims will 
be separately addressed. 
Union Park claims that the Matrix Lease involved only a 
portion of the subject premises formally occupied by Gump & 
Ayers (Union Park's brief, p. 11, J 15). However, the Gump & 
Ayers* Lease of June 1, 1983 (R. 66) involved only 4,497 
square feet and the Gump & Ayers1 Lease of June 28, 1985 (R. 
84) involved only 912 square feet, a total space of 5,409 
square feet on the second floor. In this regard, the Court 
should note that the Matrix Lease of November 23, 1988 (R. 
4 
135) included 10,039 square feet on the second floor.2 Thus, 
the replacement lease permitted Union Park to lease 4,630 
square feet of previously unoccupied space.3 This substantial 
economic benefit is totally ignored by Union Park in its 
argument in an attempt to create the appearance of a loss. 
Union Park further claims that when Matrix leased the 
subject premises it vacated other premises in the building 
(Union Park's brief, p. 11, fl 16). Without citation to any 
authority, and without any details as to the alleged vacant 
space, Union Park included the rents for the premises 
previously occupied by Matrix in its calculation of "damages" 
on the materiality issue. Gump & Ayers is unaware of any 
legal authority holding a tenant liable for lease payments on 
an unrelated lease arrangement that was terminated by the 
landlord and the replacement tenant. 
The self-serving claim that Union Park was "forced" to 
relet the premises at a lower rental rate is based on the 
unsupported conclusion of its general partner, Thomas Lloyd 
(R. 35, 60). By reason of the fact Union Park and Matrix had 
Prior to executing the Lease for 10,039 square feet, Matrix had previously occupied only 5,351 
square feet (R. 113). 
According to Union Park, none of the 10,039 square feet of space under the new Lease included 
space previously occupied by Matrix under it old lease (R. 35,60). 
5 
a common managing agent/ Gump & Ayers attempted to discover 
the facts supporting the conclusory statement that the reduced 
rent was "forced" rather than the result of a voluntary 
concession to Union Park's affiliate or involving 
consideration or benefits other than rent payments. Union 
Park's answers to the discovery asserted additional conclusory 
and self-serving statements (see Union Park's Answers to 
Interrogatories Nos. 3 and 4, attached to Gump & Ayers1 
original brief as Addendum Exhibit "G"). 
The self-serving claim that Union Park was "forced" to 
expend $18,559 for capital improvements is based on the 
conclusory statement of its general partner, Thomas Lloyd (R. 
35, 60). By reason of the fact that Union Park and Matrix had 
a common managing agent (see f n. 4), Gump & Ayers attempted to 
discover the facts supporting the conclusion that the capital 
improvements were "forced" rather than a voluntary concession 
to Union Park's affiliate or involving consideration or 
benefits other than rent payments. Union Park responded with 
additional self-serving conclusory statements (see Union Park 
Answers to Interrogatory Nos. 3 and 4, attached to Gump & 
Ayers' original brief as Addendum Exhibit "G"). In an attempt 
4 
J. Robert Bonnermort was one of two general partners of Union Park and was also an officer of 
Matrix (r. 207-212), Union Park acknowledged Bonnermort's dual affiliation with Matrix and Union Park (Lloyd 
Affidavit, K 10, R. 293-294). 
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to create the appearance of damage, Union Park includes the 
entire expenditure in its "damage" calculation ignoring the 
enhanced value of the premises at the expiration of the Matrix 
Lease. 
The many factual issues inherent in the materiality issue 
are apparent. In this regard, as noted in Gump & Ayers1 
original brief, materiality is a factual guestion which should 
be determined by a jury. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc., 557 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1976); Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 
P.2d 789 (Utah 1984); Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 
1954). 
POINT III 
ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF 
FRAUD ARE ESTABLISHED 
Union Park erroneously asserts that in alleging the 
defense of fraud in the inducement, Gump & Ayers must 
establish all of the elements of an affirmative fraud claim. 
It appears Union Park contends that each element of fraud 
must be expressly stated in an affidavit. However, the law is 
clear that the elements can be established by facts and 
inferences from facts. Frederick May & Company v. Dunn, 368 
P.2d 266 (Utah 1962); Durham v. Maraetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 
1977). In this regard, Gump & Ayers need not submit a sworn 
statement that Union Park knew its statement regarding vacancy 
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of the subject premises was false. On the contrary, such 
knowledge may be inferred from the fact that at the time of 
the statement, Union Park had executed a lease with Matrix 
describing the subject premises. 
The Affidavit of Jerry Floor (R. 189) together with the 
written lease of the subject premises to Matrix, bearing a 
date prior to the execution of the Promissory Note, establish 
all of the elements of a fraud claim. It follows with greater 
force that such evidence establishes the defense of fraud. 
A representation was made concerning a presently existing 
material fact (R. 191-192), which the declarant knew to be 
false (R. 135), for the purpose of inducing the other party to 
act (R. 191-192) and Gump & Ayers acted in ignorance of the 
falsity of the statement (R. 194) and relied upon the 
statement in executing the Promissory Note to its injury 
(R. 194-195). Accordingly, all of the elements of fraud have 
been established. 
POINT IV 
GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION TO AMEND 
WAS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
BEFORE THE LOWER COURT 
In an attempt to justify the lower court's denial of Gump 
& Ayers1 Motion to Amend, Union Park asserts that the Motion 
to Amend "was unsupported by either affidavits or a 
8 
memorandum." Such argument is contrary to the record before 
the Court. 
The Motion to Amend was filed on March 21, 1991, 
(R. 235). At the same time, Gump & Ayers filed the Affidavit 
of Jerry Floor (R. 189). Paragraphs 12 and 18 of Jerry 
Floor's Affidavit expressly noted the facts supporting Gump & 
Ayers' Motion to Amend (R. 193-194, 195-196). At the time the 
Motion to Amend was filed, Gump & Ayers also filed its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 213). Paragraphs 
45 and 46 of the Memorandum expressly address the grounds upon 
which the Motion to Amend was based (R. 222-223). 
Furthermore, although not required by Rule 15, Gump & Ayers' 
attached copies of the proposed Amended Answer (R. 238) and a 
copy of the proposed Counterclaim (R. 243). Thus, contrary to 
Union Park's argument, all of the grounds supporting the 
Motion to Amend were presented to the lower court 
simultaneously with the Motion. 
POINT V 
GUMP & AYERS1 MOTION TO 
AMEND WAS TIMELY FILED 
In a further attempt to justify the lower court's denial 
of Gump & Ayers' Motion to Amend, Union Park asserts, without 
9 
citation of authority, that Gump & Ayers1 "delay" in filing 
the Motion to Amend was "not excusable."5 
Union Park asserts that Gump & Ayers should have asserted 
fraud at an earlier point in time despite the absence of any 
investigation to establish the defense as required by Rule 11. 
Union Park further asserts a vague suggestion that Rule 15 has 
a time limit. Not a single authority is cited in support of 
either argument. 
Gump & Ayers respectfully submits that in the 
circumstances of this case, there was no undue delay in filing 
the Motion to Amend. Moreover, in light of the reservation 
noted in Gump & Ayers1 original answer6, Union Park was fully 
advised as to Gump & Ayers1 position in the matter and was not 
prejudiced by the "delay." 
Furthermore, in its ruling, the lower court expressly 
stated that her denial of the Motion to Amend was not based 
upon any finding that the Motion was untimely (R. 442-443). 
The only legal authority cited by Union Park on the issue was West ley v. Farmer's Insurance 
Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). The West ley case holds that the timeliness of a motion to amend is 
determined in the discretion of the trial court. As noted in the text of this brief, the lower court in this 
case held that the Motion to Amend was not untimely (R. 442-443). Furthermore, the West ley case involved a 
motion to amend that had been delayed an entire year and, if granted, would have delayed the scheduled trial. 
Such circumstances clearly distinguish the West ley case from the instant case. 
The third defense of Gump & Ayers' initial Answers stated: 
Defendant reserves the right to conduct discovery to 
determine if the Promissory Note was procured by fraud. In 
the event discovery produces evidence of fraud, Defendant 
reserves the right to amend this Answer to assert fraud in 
the inducement. 
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POINT VI 
THE ARGUMENT THAT THE LOWER COURT 
CONSIDERED THE EVIDENCE AS THOUGH 
THE MOTION TO AMEND HAD BEEN 
GRANTED IS SPECULATIVE 
Union Park argues that the lower court gave full 
consideration to the facts relating to fraud despite the fact 
that the Motion to Amend, which asserted fraud, was denied by 
the lower court. In light of the lower court's denial of the 
Motion to Amend, the argument that the denial of the Motion to 
Amend had no impact on consideration of fraud evidence is 
speculative. 
Admittedly, there is some language in the lower court's 
ruling (R. 436-448) that supports the claim that the fraud 
evidence was considered. However, there is also language that 
suggests that the ruling on the Motion to Amend had some 
impact on the lower court's consideration of the fraud 
evidence: 
MR. MCDONALD: The problem I have, if the 
Motion to Amend is not granted, then 
fraud isn't before the court on summary 
j udgment. 
MR. SWAN: It is in the way of the 
affirmative defense on how to defend a 
motion. 
THE COURT: Well, you defended on that 
basis and I considered it in that 
context. It was a pending motion I 
reserved on that. I indicated I had read 
11 
all the pleadings about it. Motion to 
Amend is denied. (Ruling, R. 443). 
(Emphasis added). 
Gump & Ayers respectfully submits that in reviewing the 
ruling of the lower court, it must be presumed that the lower 
court followed the general law which precludes consideration 
of evidence of fraud in the absence of a pleading asserting 
such defense. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h). In 
such a circumstance, Gump & Ayers respectfully submits that 
the denial of its Motion to Amend to assert the defense of 
fraud must be presumed to have had material impact on the 
lower courtfs consideration of the fraud evidence and that the 
failure to fully consider such evidence under the 
circumstances of this case constituted an abuse of discretion. 
POINT VII 
THE PROMISSORY NOTE PROVIDES A SPECIFIC 
TIME PERIOD FOR THE FLAT RATE INTEREST 
With respect to Union Park• s argument on the interest 
rate issue, the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-3 do 
not mandate a per annum rate. The statute applies only when 
"no period of time is stated . . . ." 
The Promissory Note in the instant case specifies the 
time period to which the ten percent (10%) flat rate was to be 
applied. In this regard, the Promissory Note expressly states 
"this Note shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent 
12 
(10%) from and after May 1, 1988" (R. 8). The Promissory Note 
further establishes that there were to be 18 monthly 
installments and, excluding those months in which no 
installment was due, the last installment was to be made on 
October 1, 1991,7 a period of 30 months. This results in a 
total interest of $5,500 or $183.33 per month during the 
thirty-month period of the Note. 
Gump & Ayers concedes that after the period of interest 
specified in the Promissory Note, the interest would accrue at 
the statutory rate specified in Utah Code Annotate § 15-1-1. 
The case of Jackson v. Fennimore, 230 Pac. 689 (Okla. 
1924), provides no support for Union Park's argument. The 
Jackson case involved different statutory wording and the 
issue was not properly raised by the pleadings in that case. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgments entered by the lower court in favor 
of Union Park should be reversed for the reasons stated in 
Gump & Ayers1 original brief and supplemented in this reply 
brief. 
The Order denying the summary judgment filed by Gump & 
Ayers should be reversed for the reasons stated in Gump & 
The Promissory Note provided for six installments payments each calendar year from May to 
October making the final installment due on October 1, 1991. 
13 
Ayers1 original brief and supplemented in this reply brief. 
DATED this *h0 day of June, 1993. 
1TCD0NALD, WEST & BENSON 
\ Jr 
By 
M. McDonald 
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ADDENDUM 
Pf 1 ^am*« " -acq maS Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-1 
JUI 13 1993 
Utah Code Annotate § 15-1-1 (Supplement) 
Utah Code Annotated § 15-1-3 
COURI Of M<VEALS 
TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
IN GENERAL 
Chapter 
1. Interest. 
2. Legal Capacity of Children. 
3. Interparty Agreements. 
4. Joint Obligations. 
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed]. 
6. Prompt Payment Act. 
7. Registered Public Obligations Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
Section 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — 
Legal rate. 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 
Section 
15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed. 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for 
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the 
subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, 
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any 
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or 
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 1; C.L. 1907, as Subsections (2) and (3); and made stylistic 
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; changes. 
L. 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, Cross-References. — Payment of interest 
ch. 73, § 1; 1985, ch. 159, § 6; 1989, ch. 79, as extending statute of limitations, § 78-12-44. 
§ !• Rate where unspecified in instrument, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- § 70A-3-118 
ment. effective April 24, 1989, redesignated
 T i m e a t w n i c h i n t e r e s t c o m m e n ces running, 
r
°J?e/><iUh>Se .I™ T af Subsection (1) and
 §§ 7 0 A .3 .118, 70A-3-122. ffi^ sits fSSSTt^ utah c — c"d* C o d e > § 70C-1-101 et 
and second sentences of former Subsection (1) se<'' 
847 
TITLE 15 
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
IN GENERAL 
Chapter 
1. Interest. 
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTEREST 
Section 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 200 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8 (1992). 
15-1-4- Interest on judgments. 
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the con-
tract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be 
specified in the judgment. 
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment inter-
est rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%. 
(3) "Federal postjudgment interest rate" means the interest rate estab-
lished for the federal court system under 28 U.S.C Sec. 1961, as amended. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907, nated the existing language as Subsections (1) 
§ 1241x9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933 & C. and (2) and made related changes, substituted 
1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2; 1993, ch. "to the contract" for "thereto" in Subsection (1), 
198, § 1. rewrote Subsection (2), which read "Other 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- judgments shall bear interest at the rate of 
ment, effective May 3, 1993, divided and desig- 12% per annum," and added Subsection (3). 
142 
INTEREST 15-1-3 
instances where interest accrues as a matter of 
law but no specific rate has been agreed to; it 
does not create a right to interest where none 
otherwise exists. Vali Convalescent & Care 
Insts. v. Division of Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 
438 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
School districts. 
School district, where it has received the 
benefit of goods, should pay the legal rate of 
interest from the date it received the benefit of 
its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark 
Co., 53 Utah 336, 178 P. 764 (1919). 
Unconscionability. 
Where one loaning money had received the 
full amount of money loaned and interest 
amounting to 15% per annum, the debt was 
held fully paid, and the lender could not re-
cover anything in addition. Carter v. West, 38 
Utah 381, 113 P. 1025 (1910). 
Cited in Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, 
Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Usury 
Implications Of Alternative Mortgage Instru-
ments: The Uncertainty In Calculating Per-
missible Returns, 1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1105. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and 
Usury § 63 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 32. 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of disclo-
sure statutes requiring one extending credit or 
making loan to giwe statement showing terms 
as to amounts involved and charges made, 14 
A.L.R.3d 330. 
Validity and construction of provision (esca-
lator clause) in land contract or mortgage that 
rate of interest payable shall increase if legal 
rate is raised, 60 A.L.R.3d 473. 
Compensation for interest prepayment pen-
alty in eminent domain proceedings, 84 
A.L.R.3d 946. 
Prejudgment interest awards in divorce 
cases, 62 A.L.R.4th 156. 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Sections 15-1-2 and 15-l-2a (L. 
1907, ch. 46, § 2; C.L. 1907, $ 1241x; C.L. 
1917, § 3321; R.S. 1933, 44-0-2; L. 1935, ch. 42, 
§ 1; C. 1943, 44-0-2; L. 1953. ch. 24, §§ 1, 2; 
1955, ch. 20, § 1; 1965, ch. 25, § 1), relating to 
maximum interest rates on loans and condi-
tional sales contracts, were repealed by Laws 
1969, ch. 18, § 9.103. 
15-1-3. Calculated by the year. 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or verbal contract, or in any 
public or private instrument whatever, any certain rate of interest is men-
tioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate 
mentioned by the year. 
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § 7; C.L. 1907, 
§ 1241x5; C.L. 1917, § 3326; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 44-0-3. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 47 C.J.S. Interest § 42. 
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